Israel’s foreign policy has traditionally focused on the West, primarily the United States, while neglecting the potential of the Middle East and Africa regions. This trend, shaped by hostile relations with the Arab world and a sense of cultural affinity with the West, nevertheless leads to missed economic, diplomatic, and security opportunities.
The Abraham Accords demonstrated the region’s potential for openness, yet the “villa in the jungle” mindset still dictates priorities in practice. The current approach reflects a detachment from the regional geopolitical environment and prevents Israel from realizing its influence as a regional power, while also blinding it to emerging changes and threats. Israel must internalize its natural belonging to the Middle East and act from a position of self-confidence and assertiveness, with an integrative view of regional interests.
An integrative approach requires a deep familiarity with the relationships among Arab states themselves and an understanding of their interests. The more we grasp the dynamics of regional politics, the more we can initiate solutions, solve problems independently, and avoid constantly running to Washington for mediation. This approach means that major initiatives—such as an agreement with Saudi Arabia or the IMEC trade corridor—should proceed in a way that benefits all neighboring states.
By contrast, when Israel cooperates with hostile actors such as Qatar, which is viewed negatively by other Gulf states, it becomes an object of contempt in the eyes of the Emiratis and Saudis.
To instill this shift in mindset within the diplomatic system, organizational steps are also required, including: transferring responsibility for managing relations with states that do not have diplomatic ties with Israel from the Mossad to the National Security Council; creating two new ministerial-level positions within the Foreign Ministry—a minister for Middle Eastern and Arab affairs and a minister for African affairs; and upgrading the status of ambassadors to regional countries.
In addition, Israel should insist on reciprocal official visits and institutionalize international conferences of regional states in Israel—for example, an Africa conference in Israel every five years and a Middle-East states conference every two years.
It should be emphasized that Israel’s ability to position itself as a diplomatic leader as described in this chapter depends on a decisive and unequivocal defeat of Hamas in Gaza and on fully bringing the Nukhba terrorists to justice. These two steps would demonstrate that Sunni Islamism is in the losing camp and that Israel is determined to stand firm against its enemies. Anything less would give tailwind to Sunni Islamism throughout the region and challenge regimes willing to cooperate with Israel.
