To create genuine security, Israel’s security establishment, including the intelligence community, must adopt a strategic posture of readiness at dawn. This posture reduces the extent to which operational preparedness is dependent upon specific intelligence information and instead focuses on the enemy’s capabilities independent of assessments of its intentions.[1] This approach should be pursued in parallel with a sustained and broad effort to preserve the strength and qualitative superiority of Israel’s intelligence community and its ability to provide effective strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence.

An “intelligence paradigm” is the manner in which a state chooses to develop, organize and employ its intelligence bodies so that their intelligence outputs address the requirements of national security. A sound intelligence paradigm is critical to national security.

The changes that have taken place in Israel’s security concept over the past three decades have also led to a fundamental transformation in the national intelligence paradigm, which contributed to the formation of the Iranian “ring of fire” around Israel and to the catastrophic intelligence failure of October 7^th, 2023.

The changes in Israel’s security concept have increased the relative weight of Israeli intelligence, making it the most dominant element. The shift toward over-reliance on “counterfire,” “precision,” “influence,” and “interwar campaigns” raised the reliance on the intelligence community.

The existing intelligence paradigm embodies several fundamental problems, including:

• There is no formal regulation governing the operation of the intelligence community at the national security level.
• TheHeads of Services Committee (VaRash) has no statutory basis.
• There is a lack of systematic guidance and oversight by the political echelon over the intelligence organizations.
• The Israeli cabinet is highly dependent on the intelligence establishment for“reality assessment,” particularly regarding strategic evaluation.
• Intelligence activity is primarily oriented towardinterwar campaigns, with excessive reliance on technological collection sources and the marginalization of “classic” collection capabilities that are not perceived as technologically cutting-edge.
• Units and collection capabilities intended mainly for wartime have been closed.

The Required Reforms: The changes needed in Israel’s intelligence paradigm involve establishing conceptual clarity, regulating the intelligence establishment through the enactment of a National Intelligence Law, granting statutory authority to the Heads of Services Committee (VaRash), creating a dedicated framework for political-strategic research and assessment outside the military, establishing a guiding principle of maintaining diversity and balance among collection sources, ensuring continuous preparedness and readiness for wartime, shifting the operational concept toward emerging threats, and creating new balances in “peace arenas.”[2]

[1] This does not mean that intentions are ignored, but rather that the military builds its forces and prepares based on the potential of the enemy’s military threat.

[2] Ittai Baron, Intelligence Research – Reality Assessment in an Era of Transformations and Changes, updated edition, The Institute for the Study of Intelligence Methodology, The Center for Intelligence Heritage and The Institute for the Study of Intelligence Methodology, January 2021.