The State of Israel faces a challenging security environment, shaped by a prolonged conflict with the Arab–Muslim world from the beginnings of Zionism to the present day. Since its establishment, Israel has sought to ensure its survival through a high-quality military force designed to defeat its enemies in every encounter and to project military power. According to the classic security doctrine, based on Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s “Iron Wall” doctrine as adopted by David Ben-Gurion, only by demonstrating military superiority will Israel’s enemies come to terms with the state’s existence. Accordingly, the State of Israel has allocated substantial national resources to its defense establishment, foremost among them compulsory conscription and the sustained investment of a significant share of GDP in security needs.

However, over the years the state’s security doctrine changed, a shift reflected in the reduction of resources allocated to the IDF’s ground maneuver forces. In response to changes in the threat environment—including the signing of peace agreements with some former enemy states—a prolonged transition to a “small and smart” military unfolded. As part of this process, the size of the ground forces declined due to the closure of brigades and divisions, and the reserve force was eroded. The emphasis shifted toward investment in high-end technologies, the Air Force, military intelligence, and technological defensive systems such as the Iron Dome and “smart” border barriers, based on the belief that future wars would be conducted primarily through sophisticated weapons systems rather than large-scale ground combat.

Recent wars, foremost among them the Iron Swords War, exposed the severe consequences of this shift. Although the IDF succeeded in achieving partial ground control and inflicted significant damage on Hamas and Hezbollah, the lack of sufficient maneuver forces led to difficulties in urban warfare and in achieving a rapid, decisive outcome. At the root of this change lay a failure in defining the reference threat, which focused on the enemies’ intentions rather than on their actual military capabilities. This scenario did not adequately account for the possibility of multi-front warfare, nor did it include preparedness for surprise ground attacks within the territory of the State of Israel.

This document argues that the severe damage sustained by Israel’s adversaries in the most recent war—including Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and the Syrian regime—does not justify delaying the strengthening of the ground forces, as proposed by recent government committees. There are four main reasons for this:

1. Terror threats do not disappear—they recover:Even after Hamas and Hezbollah have absorbed heavy blows, they may recover, as has happened in the past. The rehabilitation and rearmament mechanisms of terrorist organizations do not come to a halt; therefore, the IDF must maintain ready and capable ground forces.
2. Focusing on intentions rather than capabilities is a conceptual failure:For years, Israel’s reference scenario was based on analyses of the enemy’s intentions rather than on assessments of its capabilities. This approach overlooked the fact that potential threats—such as Egypt, Jordan, Shiite militias, and radical Islamist forces in the Middle East—could become active adversaries in the future.
3. Building ground force capability is a long-term process and must not be left to the last minute:Establishing a new armored brigade is not a one-or-two-year endeavor; it requires many years of investment in manpower, training, and the procurement of suitable equipment. Building several brigades—and certainly divisions—takes a great deal of time, and therefore the process must begin now.
4. A strong ground force is a strategic-political tool:This is not just a necessity at the operational level. A powerful military projects national strength, reinforces deterrence, and provides Israel with room to maneuver on the international stage. Neglecting the ground forces, on the other hand, weakens Israel’s standing and limits its freedom of action in times of crisis.

To ensure Israel’s continued ability to defend itself, this document proposes a fundamental change to the current nature of Israel’s force deployment and, consequently, in its force build-up. The force deployment concept rests on four principles: initiative, decisiveness, power, and the conduct of combat on enemy territory. As a result, a force build-up is required that will restore and strengthen the ground forces, while developing the capability to defend on all fronts and to conduct offensive operations on multiple fronts simultaneously. This is not meant to replace the current excellent long-range capabilities of the Air Force—which should be maintained- but rather that rebuilding the ground maneuver forces should be prioritized over further expansion and continued over-emphasis on air power.

In order to rebuild Israel’s capability for decisive ground maneuvers, a series of changes in force build-up must be implemented:

1. Expanding the order of battle of the ground forces:Additional brigades and divisions must be established in numbers sufficient to enable simultaneous defense on all fronts and concurrent offensive operations on the required fronts. These divisions and brigades must possess full operational readiness and an appropriate training framework.
2. Ground-based firepower:An independent and diverse fire capability must be developed for the maneuvering forces. This firepower should cover short- and medium-range engagements, across the full spectrum of intensity and with varying levels of precision.
3. Combat engineering:Engineering units must be expanded so that every brigade combat team includes an engineering battalion, or at least a reinforced heavy engineering equipment company. In addition, improved solutions must be developed—within the Engineering Corps or elsewhere—for dealing with underground threats.
4. Tactical battlefield intelligence:Relevant combat collection capabilities must be developed, and collection frameworks established at multiple echelons.
5. Combat mobility:Broad mobility capabilities must be restored across all forces. This may include light vehicles, armored trucks, light AFVs, or any other solutions suited to the operational concept.
6. Administrative and logistical support:It must be ensured that, alongside the buildup of the combat forces, the logistical support capabilities of those forces are developed as well.
7. The near‑ground airspace:The project should include an operational concept as well as the acquisition of drones, drone swarms, and additional aerial platforms—each with distinct capabilities (visual, radar, explosive payloads, and others).
8. Night fighting:Extensive procurement of night‑vision equipment must be undertaken for all maneuvering units across all branches.
9. Improving the readiness and preparedness of the reserve forces:The reserve system is a critical pillar in a full‑scale war, yet it currently suffers from erosion in both operational readiness and equipment levels.

Moreover, the new concept emphasizes the importance of extensive ground maneuver as an integral component of Israel’s overall military doctrine. In the international arena, the State of Israel often faces diplomatic pressure that limits the duration of war-fighting. Rapid and decisive ground maneuver can secure military achievements that help translate battlefield success into political gains. Ground maneuver should therefore be regarded as a central means of defeating adversaries and preserving long‑term deterrence. This does not mean raising the defense budget to extraordinary levels of GDP as was mistakenly done following the Yom Kippur War, but rather a rise of a few percentage points relative to Israel’s GDP, similar to that recommended by the recent government committee, and as a specific, time-limited, multi-year defense plan, so as not to harm Israel’s credit rating.

This policy poses significant implementation challenges, yet it is vital to ensuring Israel’s combat capability in the face of unpredictable future threats. Israel must acknowledge that the struggle for its existence is far from over, and that it must build a military force that is strong, resilient, flexible, and constantly prepared for any possible scenario. The document calls upon the nation—its citizens and its leaders—to once again adopt a mindset of resilience and continued preparedness, alongside the enduring aspiration for prosperity and growth, grounded in the understanding that the challenges facing the State of Israel are not transient. A state with a deep Jewish national identity, combining strength and determination with economic success and innovation, is the key to our success and prosperity.