Civilian oversight of Israel’s defense system exists at the formal level, but in practice, the political echelon is deeply dependent on the IDF as the almost exclusive source of security knowledge, strategic assessments, and alternative analyses. The military’s control over intelligence information, planning capabilities, and the framing of conceptual approaches creates a situation of epistemic hegemony, which weakens the capacity of the elected leadership and narrows its real space for choice.
While responsibility for defining security policy and making decisions is supposed to rest with the political leadership, in practice it relies almost exclusively on proposals from the defense establishment, struggles to generate alternatives—particularly with regard to force buildup—and at times is drawn into endorsing plans originating in the military without conducting an independent strategic dialogue. The institutional mechanisms meant to bridge this gap—the prime minister’s military secretary and the National Security Council—do not provide an effective solution: the former is subordinate to the military hierarchy, while the latter suffers from structural weakness, a lack of resources, and a lack of legitimacy as an independent actor vis-à-vis the defense establishment.
The result is a concentration of knowledge and operational authority in the hands of the military, which at times extends beyond the sphere of professional military expertise and leads it to shape policy processes in explicitly political as well as strategic domains. Alternative viewpoints are scarcely heard, and the political leadership remains without a genuine capacity to scrutinize the recommendations placed before it or to challenge those who advance them. This phenomenon was especially pronounced during emergency periods such as the Iron Swords War, when operational rigidity was evident, and the political echelon struggled to advance alternative conceptions.
In the long-term, in order to strengthen the decision-making options of the political leadership, a genuine shift is required. Major steps include:
- Strengthening the National Security Council and transforming it into a professional body with real influence and broad authorities to obtain independent information and conduct autonomous security staff work.
- Reducing the military’s involvement in shaping foreign policy and in non-military matters, and redirecting primary national engagement in these areas to the civilian echelon.
- Requiring the political leadership to undergo structured security training, enabling informed and substantive deliberation vis-à-vis the defense establishment.
Beyond these critical steps for long-term reform, this article proposes that in the short-term an independent security advisory team should be established for the Prime Minister—and possibly for the Cabinet as well—composed of civilian experts who are institutionally detached from the defense establishment. Such a team would provide the political leadership with professional advice in the security domain that is free of institutional bias. The members of the team would be appointed by the Prime Minister and Cabinet members as personal appointments and would serve for short-terms, aligned with the tenure of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. The team’s role would be to formulate recommendations for the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, as needed, on issues under consideration, or to bring to the political leadership’s attention matters that, in its view, require their engagement. In addition, the team would independently—or in dialogue with the defense establishment—examine alternatives to the defense system’s proposals on operational matters and force buildup, while giving expression to the preferences of the political leadership.
In addition, the team would be able to engage in dialogue with Israeli and international research institutes on these matters. Currently, such dialogue occurs at the military level only to a limited extent and on peripheral issues. This team would not replace the position of the defense establishment—that would remain central—but would serve as a “light platform” for challenging the plans and situation assessments of the operational planning bodies and the National Security Council (the “heavy platforms”) and could present a parallel position—supportive or opposing—to that of the defense establishment, enabling informed discussion of the alternatives under consideration.
The current situation makes it difficult for the political leadership to make independent security decisions and leads to an almost complete reliance on the defense establishment’s position. Strengthening civilian advisory systems, creating knowledge-based alternatives, and ensuring effective oversight of the defense establishment are essential steps to secure national security grounded in broad and balanced considerations.
