



ARGAMAN



Beyond Oslo: Israeli Policy in Judea and Samaria

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The Paradigm Project: A New Strategic Agenda for Israel

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Chapter 9

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Executive Summary

The Palestinian arena in Judea and Samaria is unstable, and the current situation poses a serious and continuous threat to the State of Israel. The Palestinian leadership does not accept Israel's very existence, indoctrinates the next generation with profound hatred toward Israel, and remains committed to the phased plan for establishing a Palestinian state from the river to the sea. Persistent terrorist threats exist, and the forces of the Palestinian Authority (PA) are either unable or unwilling to confront them, alongside the risk that these forces themselves could turn their guns against Israel. The PA leads international efforts to weaken Israel's international standing, is systematically taking over Area C, is unilaterally creating facts on the ground, and is harming natural resources and the environment. These threats have intensified since Oct. 7th, and the PA does not meaningfully distance itself from Hamas's aspirations. There is no realistic prospect that, under the current conditions, a Palestinian leadership genuinely seeking true peace with Israel will emerge. It is also clear to most Israelis that the establishment of a Palestinian state would mean the creation of a "Hamastan" in Judea and Samaria and constitute an existential threat to the State of Israel. Therefore, the illusion of separation inherent in the Oslo paradigm must be abandoned once and for all.

In light of these threats, Israel should adopt the long-term goal of a single sovereign state—Israel—while granting the Arab population the broadest possible scope for local self-governance, alongside the opening of pathways both for voluntary emigration and for a gradual process from residency to Israeli citizenship.

Defining the end-goal as a single sovereign state would be a strategic shift and requires careful planning in order to prevent, on the one hand, Israel from becoming a bi-national state, and on the other hand, the creation of a prolonged situation of unjustified discrimination that parts of the Israeli public would not accept and that would also generate significant international pressure. Nevertheless, this goal is feasible and, has more potential for success than the alternative establishing a Palestinian State to live in peace alongside Israel.

However, defining the end-goal as a single sovereign state does not necessarily require the immediate application of sovereignty over all areas of Judea and Samaria. Rather, this objective can be pursued gradually and flexibly, according to circumstances and emerging opportunities. Four parallel courses of action are proposed here to be implemented simultaneously based on the political feasibility and international circumstances.

First Axis: Gradual application of sovereignty and reform of land management policy – there are areas where the application of sovereignty can be done relatively easily, namely: the Jordan Valley and Greater Ma'ale Adumim. From there, the process can advance to the large settlement blocs and eventually to the entire territory. In parallel, the government should formalize all land claims by updating the official land registry (Tabu) with proper documentation. This would provide legal protection, prevent unlawful seizure, and enable a functioning, economically viable real estate market.

Second Axis: Taking responsibility for infrastructure and upgrading Israeli administrative offices – The State of Israel must assume responsibility for all civilian infrastructure in Judea and Samaria (hereinafter J&S), which is currently handled inadequately and partially. This includes overseeing transportation, electricity, water, gas, renewable energy, air quality, wastewater treatment, waste management, and key natural resources like the mountain aquifer. At the same time, the roles of the Civil Administration and COGAT should be redefined to operate proactively, efficiently, and with a clear focus on maintaining Israeli sovereignty.

Third Axis: Dissolution of the Palestinian Authority and transition to decentralized local governance, voluntary emigration or residency process – Decentralized local governance, like Arab municipalities within Israel, would have incentives to avoid funding terror and incitement against

the state. As part of the transition to local governance, a fundamental reform of educational content is required, removing all incitement and promoting recognition of Israel and its positive benefits. Israel should carefully dismantle security infrastructures that threaten its safety, including PA security forces, while considering incentives. Two pathways should be offered: (1) a voluntary emigration program with fair compensation and property, and (2) a residency and citizenship track conditional on renouncing terrorism and accepting civic obligations. This dual-pathway approach will help achieve sustainable demographic balance within the region.

Fourth Axis: Effective international advocacy – A well-structured public diplomacy program is required to explain the plan to other countries. While it is not necessary for all to be convinced, Israel must present its rationale and explain why this is a fair measure and the only approach capable of ensuring prosperity and security for all populations.

While no perfect alternative exists, this single sovereign state model offers the best prospect for guaranteeing Israel's existence and security for future generations, whereas continuing the current situation carries much higher costs and risks.

How did we get here? The Oslo Paradigm and the Establishment of the Palestinian Authority

Until the signing of the Oslo Accords, Israel administered Judea, Samaria and Gaza under a military governance model, while granting relative freedom of movement and employment throughout Israel to all their residents. Against the backdrop of the Palestinian Arabs' rejection of partition proposals and various autonomy plans, and in response to the pressure created by the First Intifada, the Rabin government pushed for the Oslo agreements. The first agreement in the Oslo process was signed in 1993, transferring control of Gaza and Jericho to the Palestinian Authority (PA). In 1995, Oslo II was signed, expanding the scope of Palestinian autonomy to include areas of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank).¹ These agreements were also considered temporary arrangements, whereas any permanent settlement or final-status agreement was explicitly postponed to a later date that has still not arrived. In practice, the signed agreements created a partial administrative and security status quo but did not resolve the central issues of the conflict. To this day, there is no bilateral agreement that resolves the Palestinian demand for statehood or

Israel continues to act cautiously: on one hand, it opposes unilateral measures by the Palestinian Authority and international recognition of a Palestinian state, and on the other, it does not take action to establish its sovereignty over the long term

Israel's rights over the land, alongside its demand for security, and therefore legally and politically, the agreements remain non-final.

The Oslo agreements passed in the Knesset by an extremely narrow margin, highlighting the absence of broad national consensus for such dramatic measures. While part of the public viewed the agreements as a bold step toward peace, others saw them as a significant risk to Israel's security. Rabin himself did not support a fully sovereign Palestinian state but only administrative autonomy. In his final speech in the Knesset on October 5, 1995, considered his political testament, Rabin declared, "We aspire to a Palestinian entity that is less than a state."²

Since then, Israeli governments—left, center, and even right—have tried various policies including: attempting to reach

1 Yuval Blumberg, *The Oslo Trap* (Tel Aviv: Sela Meir, 2024) [in Hebrew]; Christopher Barder, *Oslo's Gift of "Peace": The Destruction of Israel's Security* (Jerusalem: ACPR, 2001). [in Hebrew]

2 Yitzhak Rabin, "Government Statement on the Approval of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement," *Knesset Proceedings*, 13th Knesset, Special Session, 11 Tishrei 5756 (October 5, 1995), Plenary Protocol. Quotation: "We want this to be an entity that is less than a state and that will independently manage the lives of the Palestinians under its authority." [in Hebrew]

a comprehensive agreement to end the conflict, unilateral withdrawal, or simply managing the conflict with no clear future direction. The Palestinian side rejected any proposal that would declare the end of the conflict, even ones that would create an independent state, because its primary goal has always been and remains a single Arab state from the river to the sea. Today, there is a broad consensus in Israel that there is no partner for genuine peace in the foreseeable future. In practice, however, Israel continues to act cautiously: on one hand, it opposes unilateral measures by the Palestinian Authority and international recognition of a Palestinian state, and on the other, it does not take action to establish its sovereignty over the long term.

This dual approach stems, on one hand, from the recognition of the existential dangers that a Palestinian state would pose to Israel, and on the other hand, from a desire to keep this hypothetical possibility open for the distant future, mainly for international considerations. However, it involves ignoring the fact that the current situation is not static and itself poses serious threats to the State of Israel, while also ensuring that these dangers will only intensify over time.

The Illusion of a “Separate and Fenced Off” Palestinian State

The idea that has been raised occasionally—of creating a “separate and fenced-off” Palestinian state, disconnected from Israel—has no basis in reality and reflects strategic blindness. The disengagement from Gaza serves as a test case for this idea; the result was the establishment of a terror statelet on Israel’s border, which exploited every fragment of freedom to develop an unprecedented security threat against Israel. Judea and Samaria in the hands of an independent Palestinian state, located close to Israel’s population centers and controlling the mountainous terrain that dominates the coastal plain, would immediately become an existential danger. A Palestinian state, even if fenced off and disconnected, would always remain a hub of terrorism and instability directed against Israel. The illusion that it is possible to “get rid of the problem” is a sure recipe for another security catastrophe and for continued international pressure on Israel.³

The belief held by many Israelis that in the long term there is no alternative to a two-state “solution,” however implausible, is in fact a short-sighted perspective that may buy temporary calm but carries

3 There is a thesis that claims the unilateral implementation of the Disengagement Plan is the reason for its failure. In practice, we transferred authority to the Palestinian Authority under relatively stable security conditions, with proven economic and agricultural potential, and upgraded infrastructure—the PA de facto took over the plan’s implementation and signed arrangements regarding the crossings. Abu Mazen himself called the withdrawal “historic days of joy” and even ensured that it took place without incidents.

enormous strategic danger in the long term. Especially today, in light of the accumulated negative experience, Israel cannot allow any withdrawal to borders that are not defensible.⁴

Today it is clearer than ever to most of the Israeli public that the establishment of a Palestinian state would mean “Hamastan” or another form of a terrorist entity in Judea and Samaria, posing an existential threat to the State of Israel. What is less clear is that the current situation—under which Israel maintains freedom of military action throughout the territory while continuing to sustain the Palestinian Authority—also entails many costs and risks. In the next section we will examine the problems inherent in the status quo, and in the section following it we will propose courses of action for changing the long-term objective in a way that addresses these risks.

The Problems with the Status Quo

The PA’s Struggle against Israel and Ongoing Incitement

The fundamental problem with the Oslo model is that the Palestinian side was never truly a partner in the vision of two states for two peoples, living side by side with dignity and prosperity. Public statements by Palestinian leaders, the continued incitement in schools and mosques promoting hatred of Jews, and the emphasis on a Palestinian narrative that demonizes Israel all indicate that they do not genuinely recognize Israel’s right to exist in any borders.⁵ The peace process, as perceived by Israel and the United States, was meant as a means to resolve the conflict through the establishment of two states. However, from the Palestinian perspective, it was merely as a stage on the way to realizing a vision of a single Palestinian state encompassing the entire territory of Israel.

4 Boaz Hezni, *Why Israel Cannot Exist Without Judea and Samaria*, Jerusalem: Author’s Publishing, 2020. [in Hebrew]

5 Senior officials in the PLO and the Palestinian Authority continue to express positions that challenge the very existence of the State of Israel. For example, PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas has repeatedly asserted Israel’s illegitimacy in his speeches, stating that “the Palestinian people will never recognize a Jewish state” (Abbas speech in the Palestinian Parliament, 2011; Yosef Kuperwasser and Shalom Lipner, “The Problem Is Palestinian Rejectionism – Why the PA Must Recognize a Jewish State,” *Foreign Affairs* 90 (2011), pp. 2–10). As well, systematic studies of Palestinian textbooks reveal a consistent pattern of incitement, demonization, and denial of Israel’s legitimacy. Reports by IMPACT-SE and the Knesset Research and Information Center (2016–2024) show Israel being presented as an illegitimate foreign entity, the use of non-Jewish religious terms for sites in Israel (e.g., “Al-Buraq Wall” instead of the “Western Wall”), erasure of all references to the State of Israel in maps, and justification of violence as a legitimate means to liberate Palestine (see: Arnon Groiss, *Palestinian Textbooks: The Attitude to Jews, Israel and Peace*, IMPACT-SE Report, 2024; and Knesset Research and Information Center report on Palestinian textbooks, 2016). [in Hebrew]

The Palestinian leadership's refusal to accept Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people is manifested, among other things, in the continued demand for the right of return, which is not related to the "1967 occupation" but rather to the War of Independence.⁶ Similarly, the 1974 decision of the Palestinian National Council regarding "national authority over any liberated area" is framed as a step toward "full liberation."⁷ This is a phased approach that allows partial achievements to serve as a springboard toward the ultimate goal.⁷ It should be noted that in all PLO symbols, including those of its official bodies, the map of "Greater Palestine" is depicted, covering the entire area from the sea to the Jordan River, sometimes incorporating grenades and rifles.⁸ Likewise, in the PA textbooks across all levels of education, including academic institutions, maps are consistently used that erase Israel entirely. There are documents signed by the Palestinian leadership recognizing Israel, but these are for external, symbolic, and public-relations purposes, allowing the Palestinian Authority tactical

flexibility to present whatever message is most palatable to each audience.⁹

The leadership of the PA has indeed abandoned terrorism as its primary means of exerting pressure on Israel, but it continues its struggle to delegitimize Israel internationally and acts unilaterally to create facts on the ground through illegal construction. Although it does maintain security coordination with Israel against terrorist elements, in practice this primarily serves the PA against its own rivals, while Israel is the one that does the "dirty work" that actually prevents terrorism in practice.

The unwillingness of PA leaders to unequivocally condemn even the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, further reflects their lack of recognition of Israel's right to exist. Here are several examples of statements made by the PA following the attack:

Jibril Rajoub, a Palestinian public figure and Fatah member, stated in an interview on November 22, 2023:

6 Adi Schwartz and Einat Wilf, *The War of the Right of Return*, Tel Aviv: Dvir, 2018; Joel Fishman and Yossi Kuperwasser, "Willful Blindness and the Mistake of Underestimation: The Oslo Gamble," *National Resilience, Politics and Society*, 2(1) (2020), pp. 9–50; Yosef Kuperwasser and Shalom Lipner, "The Problem Is Palestinian Rejectionism." [in Hebrew]

7 Palestinian National Council, "The Political Program" (Ten-Point Program), adopted at the 12th session of the Palestinian National Council, Cairo, June 8, 1974, PLO, <https://web.archive.org/web/20070520034344/http://www.un.int/palestine/PLO/docone.html> [in Hebrew]

8 "Official Palestinian Authority Office Erases Israel in Its Logo," *Palestinian Media Watch*, October 5, 2022, <https://palwatch.org/page/32622> [in Hebrew]

9 Morris Hirsch, "The State of Palestine Is Only a Step Toward the Destruction of the State of Israel," *Mabat Latikshoret HaPalestinit*, September 11, 2022, <https://palwatch.org/page/41375> [in Hebrew]

What happened on October 7 did not come out of nowhere. The responsibility lies with the continuation of the crimes of the occupation, because what happened was part of a defensive war by the Palestinians... The explosion that occurred on October 7 is a natural response to this terror [by Israel], because those who control Israel are a model of the new Nazis.¹⁰

Mahmoud al-Habbash, the Supreme Sharia Judge and religious advisor to Mahmoud Abbas, said:

First, let me say that we kiss every forehead, every hand, and even every foot that carries out ribat [a religious struggle to defend Islamic land and Palestine] at the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque and in Jerusalem... We are behind them, the leadership is with them. The President [Abbas] blessed them a few days ago, strengthened them, and asked them for even more ribat.¹¹

Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), in his speech at the UN General Assembly, expressed a

purported condemnation of the Hamas attack, but simultaneously presented a symmetrical stance and criticized Israel, claiming that “the Hamas attack provided Israel with additional excuses to act in Gaza.”¹²

Popular Palestinian Support for Armed Struggle Against Israel

Surveys by the Palestinian polling institute indicate broad support for Hamas among the Palestinian population. Key findings from surveys conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) show strong backing for Hamas following the events of October 2023. A survey conducted after October 7 found that 72% of Palestinians supported Hamas’s decision to initiate the attack against Israel. Most respondents view Hamas as representing Palestinian interests more effectively than the PA. Between 46% and 63% of Palestinians believe that an armed struggle is the most effective way to achieve national goals, while support for diplomatic negotiations is significantly lower. 72% expressed support for the establishment of armed groups, such as the “Lion’s Den,” which operate independently of the Palestinian Authority.¹³

10 Friday Sermon, Official Palestinian Authority Television (PA TV), November 5, 2014; documented by *Palestinian Media Watch (Palwatch)*. [in Hebrew]

11 The Security Experts Team, “‘A Commendable Attack’: How the PA and Fatah Responded to the October 7 Events and Why They Cannot Govern in Gaza,” *The Security Experts Website*, December 12, 2023. [in Hebrew]

12 Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), in his statement at the UN General Assembly, ostensibly condemned the Hamas attack but simultaneously presented a symmetrical stance, criticizing Israel by claiming that “Hamas’ attack provided Israel with additional excuses to act in Gaza.”

13 Khalil Shikaki (Ed.), “Quarterly Public Opinion Polls,” *Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR)*, May 6, 2025.

Additionally, terrorists are often referred to as “martyrs” and “heroes,” and streets, schools, squares, and sporting events are named after them. Although there is a slight decrease in Palestinian support for the fight against Israel among Gazans, this is primarily due to the heavy price they are paying, rather than a genuine willingness to reach agreements or peace with Israel.

A Continuous Threat of Terrorist Attacks Against Israelis in Judea and Samaria and Within the Rest of Israel

In 2023 and 2024, the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) conducted extensive operations to thwart terrorist attacks against Israelis in Judea and Samaria, in Jerusalem, and within the Green Line. The following are key data points:

Thwarted attacks: In 2023, 1,032 actual terrorist attacks were thwarted. In 2024, 1,040 actual terrorist attacks were thwarted, including 689 shooting attacks, 326 bomb attacks, 13 stabbing attacks, 9 vehicular ramming attacks, 2 suicide attacks, and one attempted kidnapping. Within Israel proper, 20 terrorist cells composed of Arab citizens of Israel were exposed, five

of which planned to carry out bombings or car-bomb attacks. Israeli casualties: In 2023, 43 Israelis were killed and 225 were wounded; in 2024, 46 were killed and 337 were wounded. In 2024, 3,682 terrorist operatives were arrested in Judea and Samaria and within the Green Line, compared to 5,100 arrests in 2023.¹⁴

For comparison, in the 15 years prior to the Oslo Accords (1978–1993), 270 Israelis—both civilians and soldiers—were killed in Judea and Samaria by Palestinian terrorist organizations. In the 15 years following the accords, between 1993 and 2008, 1,450 Israelis were killed by Palestinian terrorist organizations, i.e., five and a half times as many.¹⁵ In the Gaza Strip, from 1967 until the Disengagement, 282 Israelis (including soldiers) were killed. In contrast, on October 7 alone, 1,163 Israelis¹⁶ were killed, and from that date until August 2025, a total of 1,911 Israeli civilians and soldiers had been killed.¹⁷

The Palestinian Authority, in any of its possible configurations, does not want to—or is incapable of—confronting the existing terrorist organizations. In order to secure popular support, it prefers to adopt a policy of inaction or merely symbolic action.

14 Moran Ditch, Shaul Arieli, and Rivka Meller, “Summary of Terror Attacks in Israel and Judea and Samaria, 2023–2024,” INSS website, February 2, 2025; Shin Bet, 2024 Annual Summary, *The Shin Bet in a Multi-Front War*, online. [in Hebrew]

15 Erez Tadmor, “The Blood Test of the Peace Formula – The Oslo Accords and the People of Tomorrow,” *Mida*, September 29, 2014. [in Hebrew]

16 “October 7 – The Data That Tells It All,” Government Press Office (GPO), 10.7.2024. [in Hebrew]

17 Monthly and annual terror reports on the Shin Bet website – <https://www.shabak.gov.il/reports/>; Ditsch, Arieli, and Melar, “Summary of Terror Attacks in Israel and the West Bank.” [in Hebrew]

This situation creates fertile ground for the continued transformation of Judea and Samaria into strongholds of dangerous terrorist organizations. These organizations are gaining increasing confidence and influence, and in large areas—especially where there is no permanent Israeli presence—they dare to openly and brazenly display both weapons and power.

The Threat of a Mass Attack and Infiltration into Israeli Territory from Judea and Samaria

What surprised us in the Gaza envelope on October 7 could surprise us again in the heart of the country. It is true that the existence of Israeli settlements throughout Judea and Samaria, Israeli traffic on the roads, the presence of the IDF, and the daily work of the Shin Bet all work to reduce the element of surprise. Nevertheless, the scope of activity required from the IDF and the Shin Bet across Judea and Samaria as a whole testifies to a persistent desire to carry out attacks, which, even if usually thwarted at an early stage, has not disappeared. The illusion that this involves only a small group of extremist terrorists still misleads parts of the public, but the number of attempted attacks and the variety of places from which they originate point more than anything else to the backing and sympathy enjoyed by the attackers among the broader Arab-Palestinian public that supports the continuation of violent struggle.

Moreover, in many areas the lack of any permanent Israeli presence allows terrorism to flourish. Examples include the reality in northern Samaria, the entire area between Shechem, Jenin, and Tulkarm, as well as the Tubas area, the Arura bloc in Binyamin, the Dahrieh bloc in the Hebron Hills, refugee camps, and other locations where armed organizations operate openly. The IDF operates there from time to time with significant force, but Palestinian capabilities in such areas persist. A large-scale or even relatively limited attack, using tractors and various civilian means to breach the barrier, pickup trucks, and parachuting drones in order to seize and take control of vital terrain such as a community, a military base, or a central roadway, would be relatively simple to carry out. Arab attempts to massacre Jews have been occurring for a hundred years, and the ongoing effort by Arabs in Judea and Samaria to carry them out demonstrates that this intent has not disappeared and must not be ignored.

The Threat of a Reversal of the Security Forces of the Palestinian Authority

A reversal scenario in which the security forces of the Palestinian Authority direct the weapons they received from the State of Israel against it has already occurred in 2002 during the joint patrols,¹⁸ in the midst of the Oslo terror wave known as the Second Intifada. Personnel from all Palestinian

18 Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Israeli-Palestinian War: Escalating to Nowhere*, Prager, 2005.

security apparatuses (the Preventive Security, the police, the National Security Forces, and the General Intelligence) took direct part in the fighting against IDF forces.

Even today, some of the central terror operatives are former employees of the Palestinian Authority security services, and some serve in both roles simultaneously. For example: the attack in the community of Eli (February 2024), in which a Palestinian police officer murdered two Israeli civilians; the incident in which IDF officer Major Bar Falah was killed in a clash with armed militants, among them members of the Palestinian Authority security forces; and the July 2025 attack in which the civilian Shilo Zvuluni was murdered at the commercial center at the Gush Etzion Junction by two terrorists who were active-duty officers in the Palestinian security mechanisms, among other cases. A report by the Regavim movement (2024) revealed that over the past three years, more than 80 officers and policemen from the Palestinian security services were involved in attacks against Israelis.¹⁹ If the PA comes to believe that this reflects the will of the Palestinian street, there is a high likelihood that it would join the fighting in practice against the IDF, participate in an incursion into a single community or a group of communities, or even launch an attack on the “Judea and Samaria envelope” or inside the Green Line.

Over the past three years, more than 80 officers and policemen from the Palestinian security services were involved in attacks against Israelis

PA Financial Support for Terrorism

The PA’s support for terrorism, particularly the financing of terrorists and their families, has been a consistent policy since its establishment. This support is economic, institutional, legal, and symbolic, benefiting terrorists who are imprisoned in Israel, those who have been killed (the “martyrs”), and their family members. The PA pays fixed monthly salaries to terrorists serving prison sentences in Israel, based on the severity of the attack or the length of the sentence—the longer the sentence, the higher the salary. These amounts can sometimes exceed 10,000 shekels per month. Some terrorists also receive promotions in rank, bonuses, and additional payments to their families.

For example, the terrorist Marwan Barghouti, serving five life sentences, receives the status of a “senior officer” in the Palestinian public service. Families of terrorists killed during attacks receive one-time grants of several thousand dollars, followed by monthly pensions as “compensation for the sacrifice of the son.” These grants sometimes include assistance for education, housing, and healthcare, all

¹⁹ Yona Admoni, *Police by Day – Militants by Night: Involvement of Palestinian Security Forces in Terrorism*, Regev, March 2024.

anchored in formal institutional structures. In 2004, the PA enacted the “Prisoners’ Rights Law,” which effectively makes every imprisoned terrorist a “state employee.” The law defines a terrorist as someone who “fulfilled his national duty” and grants them economic, medical, and pension rights. Responsibility for these payments is held by the PA’s Commission for Prisoners and Released Prisoners, a well-funded official body. The budget amounts to hundreds of millions of shekels per year. According to Israeli Ministry of Defense data, in 2022 the PA invested approximately 512 million shekels in payments to terrorists and their families, and about 241 million shekels to families of “shaheeds” (“martyrs”). These sums account for roughly 7% of the PA’s budget, sometimes exceeding the health or welfare budgets.

In 2018, the State of Israel enacted the “Law to Offset Palestinian Payments to Terrorists,” which allows Israel to deduct the amounts paid to terrorists from the taxes it transfers to the PA. In February 2025, the PA chairman signed a presidential decree abolishing the previous payment mechanism, which had been anchored in law, and transferred the distribution of allowances to an independent institution that provides aid based on economic hardship, ostensibly without

distinction between terrorist families and others. In practice, cuts were made, and automatic payments to roughly 1,600–1,700 prisoner families were halted. Nevertheless, most families continued to receive support through the new channel, sometimes via informal intermediaries,²⁰ and PA President Abu Mazen repeatedly stated, “We will not stop paying prisoners’ salaries, even if we are left with only one shekel.”²¹

Severe Anti-Israel and Antisemitic Incitement in the Education System and Mosques

The curricula of the Palestinian education system are full of antisemitic content, portraying Jews as an inferior race or not as human beings. Beyond the maps that completely erase the State of Israel, they glorify “shaheeds” and promote a narrative based on an ongoing struggle; and discuss the “right of return” to all parts of the homeland conquered, from Acre and Haifa through Jaffa, Ramla, and Lod to Kiryat Gat, Ashdod, and Ashkelon.²² This education ensures that hatred of Israel is preserved and passed down from generation to generation. No sovereign state would allow such “freedom of opinion and religion,” whose sole purpose is to deny the neighbor’s right to exist and even to destroy

20 Maurice Hirsch, “How Will We Know the PA Has Ended the ‘Pay-for-Slay’ Policy?”, *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs*, May 27, 2025

21 WAFA, “President Abbas Meets Representatives of the Prisoners’ Movement,” July 22, 2018. [In Hebrew]

22 “Official Palestinian Education System: Glorification of Terrorists and Delegitimization of Israel,” Ministry of Diaspora Affairs and the Fight Against Antisemitism, July 2024. [in Hebrew]

it, despite having a peace agreement with that neighbor.

Mosques serve as a central social and cultural hub for Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, and they are often used as a platform to spread incitement and encourage violence. During Friday sermons and other religious events, calls for terrorism and the promotion of hatred toward Israel are sometimes heard. Moreover, the loudspeaker systems in the mosques are occasionally used to broadcast extremist messages, which exacerbate regional tensions and fuel hostility toward Israel.

Incitement in mosques has a deep impact on the Palestinian public and intensifies hatred toward Israel. These messages, which are frequently heard and spread throughout communities, especially influence the younger generation and, in practice, lead to acts of violence and terrorism.

Unilateral Palestinian Land-Grabs

A significant portion of the land in Judea and Samaria is not registered in the land registry (Tabu). The land registration process, known as “first registration,” requires a complex proof of ownership, leaving many areas legally ownerless. Within these lands,

there is a category called “surveyed land.” The legal status of surveyed lands has not yet been resolved, placing them at the highest risk of takeover and exploitation by Palestinians. The current situation, in which surveyed lands are neither declared state lands nor registered in the land registry, creates a strategic weakness, effectively results in the loss of large amounts of land, undermines Israel’s ability to develop central and important areas, and carries security implications.

There is another type of land—declared state lands that are neither formalized nor registered in the land registry (Tabu), and are not cultivated. Even in this category, Palestinians exploit the situation: they begin cultivating the land, thereby acquiring legal possession as recognized under Ottoman law, which still applies in the area (Jews cannot do this due to a ruling by the Israeli Supreme Court requiring proof of connection documents).²³ Additionally, Palestinians carry out a unilateral land registration process in the Palestinian land registry, even in Area C, aiming to establish ownership and weaken Israeli ownership claims. Although this registration has no legal validity, it still constitutes a blatant violation of the Oslo Accords. Israel officially responded to this only recently through a

23 Supreme Court of Israel (HCJ) 5439/09 *Ahmad Abdelkader v. Military Appeals Committee* under the Order regarding Appeals Committees, Ofer Camp; and HCJ 5391/11 *Michael Lesans v. Head of the Civil Administration* (March 20, 2012), ruling by President D. Beinisch (with the agreement of Justices M. Naor and E. Arbel). In addition to the order, in the administrative sphere there is the Order regarding Lands (Interference with Private Lands) (Judea and Samaria) (No. 1586) [amended text], effective from 2010 onward. [in Hebrew]

significant cabinet decision in 2025. Israel must protest this to international bodies and demand that international institutions not recognize the unilateral Palestinian registration. But, at the same time, this requires Israel to take decisive steps in land registration and management.²⁴

The PA is not interested in regulating construction, resulting in significant neglect in this area, allowing continued de facto takeover through Arab construction. Roughly speaking, while Jews build an average of 4 housing units per dunam (1000 square meters), Palestinians build 1 unit per 4 dunams. Palestinian construction in Areas A and B is neither planned nor restricted; it spreads over a large area and occurs mainly in rural areas. Expansion efforts are mostly directed toward Area C, aiming at gaining control over it.

In this context, it is worth mentioning the Palestinian flagship outpost "Khan al-Ahmar," which still has not been addressed; the village of "Dkeika," which was established illegally and was legalized by Defense Minister Gantz, demonstrating a complete lack of understanding of the Palestinian Authority's strategic takeover trend in the Judean Desert, which aims to create a continuous presence extending to the Bedouin areas near the city of Arad; and the attempts to establish a large construction

project near the settlement of Amichai in the Shiloh Valley, among others.

Destruction of Natural Resources and Environmental Damage

The results of all open land that characterizes Palestinian behavior results in severe harm to natural resources and the environment throughout the region. Unregulated and unplanned stone quarries scar the landscape wherever there is a desire to exploit natural resources fully and immediately. Illegal water drilling reached such an extent that Israel decided to supply water to the Palestinians and built appropriate infrastructure solely to prevent the destruction of the mountain aquifer.

The Palestinians do not act to preserve the areas defined as nature reserves by the Oslo Accords but rather to take control of them. For example, under the Wye Agreements (1998), the PA was given responsibility for the "Judean Desert Reserve Areas" designated as nature reserves and green spaces, which are part of Area B. The result was total neglect, illegal construction, and frequent landscape violations, until in 2024, following political intervention by the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the regional IDF commander signed demolition and enforcement orders for the agreed-upon reserve.²⁵

24 "Israeli Security Cabinet Decision to Resume Land Registration in the West Bank Is Illegal," *Adalah*, June 2, 2025. [in Hebrew]

25 Elisha Ben-Kimon, "For the First Time: IDF Evacuates Illegal Palestinian Construction in the 'Designated

Similarly, the entire Judean Desert Plateau—the area above the cliffs on the slopes of the Hebron hills, a uniquely scenic landscape—has been severely damaged. Even areas that were previously designated as restricted “military live-fire training zones,” which blocked access, have been breached. The Palestinians have paved roads, installed electricity infrastructure, and encouraged illegal construction on the scale of thousands of homes. Illegal waste disposal sites and pirate quarries have been established, causing severe landscape violations and extensive environmental destruction. Despite numerous appeals to the PA’s agencies and legal battles, the takeover continues almost unchecked.

The anarchy in all open areas allowed by the PA results in severe harm to natural resources and the environment

Archaeological sites are also targets for destruction and takeover. Valuable archaeological finds are often looted or used as building materials—thus lost forever—as part of an effort to undermine the Jewish connection to the land.

Burning garbage is the common method of waste disposal, and it harms the air,

groundwater, and soil. Any attempt by Israel to address the issue or calls for cooperation to implement proper waste management have failed miserably. Sewage treatment facilities barely exist; Palestinians mostly rely on cesspits that pollute both groundwater and streams. Most sewage treatment plants operate only through Israeli initiatives and exclusively in Area C.

All of this demonstrates that the Palestinian Authority is completely incapable of managing the territory with an understanding of the necessary municipal needs and balances, including the preservation of natural resources and the landscape. Meanwhile, the damages continue to accumulate, and their effects are not confined to the territories but extend into the rest of Israel.

The Palestinian Authority Acts Against Israel Internationally on Diplomatic and Legal Fronts

For many years, the Palestinian Authority has been promoting a campaign of boycott, delegitimization, and criminalization of Israel on the international stage, using UN institutions, international courts, non-governmental organizations, and academic forums.²⁶ This activity aims to portray Israel as a violator of human rights, an occupying power, and an apartheid state, in order to generate political, economic, and legal

Agreement Area,” *Ynet*, December 12, 2024. [in Hebrew]

26 Liran Ofek, “The Palestinian Authority, the BDS Movement, and Delegitimization,” *INSS Website*, February 20, 2017. [in Hebrew]

pressure against it. The following is a summary of the main activities:

Referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague: In 2015, after Israel blocked the Palestinians' request to become full UN members, the Palestinian Authority joined the Rome Statute and submitted an official request to the ICC. Since then, the Authority has been working to have the ICC investigate alleged "war crimes" by Israel in Judea and Samaria, Gaza, and Jerusalem. The cases raised include "settlement-related crimes," "illegal firing" in Gaza, house demolitions, administrative arrests, and more. In 2021, the previous prosecutor opened a preliminary investigation, and in 2024, a request was submitted to reopen it.²⁷

Referral to the International Court of Justice (ICJ): In December 2022, the Palestinian Authority led a UN resolution to refer a question on the legality of the Israeli occupation to the ICJ. Although this is a request for an advisory opinion, it carries significant diplomatic weight. The opinion may address aspects such as the legality of the settlements, the status of Jerusalem, the separation barrier, the

status of the Palestinian Authority, and international law.²⁸

Integration with the BDS campaign: The Palestinian Authority does not directly initiate the BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) campaign, but it coordinates with it in principle. Senior PA officials, including Saeb Erekat and Mahmoud Abbas, have praised the campaign and called on academics, cultural institutions, and consumers to refrain from purchasing Israeli products—especially those from the settlements. The PA has even established an internal Palestinian mechanism to "monitor the implementation of the boycott."²⁹

Leading UN resolutions and agency initiatives: The Palestinian Authority promotes anti-Israel resolutions at the UN almost every month, including recognition of observer state status, condemnation of the settlements as "illegal," UNESCO resolutions against the Jewish connection to the Temple Mount and the Western Wall, condemnation of the Nation-State Law, investigations at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), and more.³⁰

27 "Statement of ICC Prosecutor on the Situation in the State of Palestine and Israel", [un.org](https://www.un.org), October 30, 2023

28 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/77/247, "Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem," December 12., 2022

29 Ali Sawafta, "Palestinians' Abbas Swings Behind Boycott Campaign", *Reuters*, 22.5.2010

30 Elior Levy, "Abu Mazen at the UN: Our capital is all of East Jerusalem—otherwise there will be no peace," *Ynet*, 27.9.2018; "President Abbas Draft Law to Boycott Settlement Products," english.wafa.ps, 31.12.2015; Ali Sawafta, "Palestinians' Abbas swings behind boycott campaign," *Reuters*, 22.5.2010; "UN chief: Palestine

Direct diplomatic action to boycott Israeli

products: The Palestinian Authority has enacted local legislation prohibiting the sale of products from the settlements in Areas A and B. In 2010, a public campaign was even conducted to boycott Israeli goods. These Palestinian consumer campaigns are sometimes funded by foreign entities and operate in coordination with the Palestinian Ministry of Economy.³¹ Additionally, all transfers of food and goods from the Israeli market to the Palestinian market pass through official channels that charge certain fees or fixed extortion payments.³²

Mobilization of academic institutions and human rights organizations:

The Palestinian Authority supports Palestinian and international organizations that run campaigns against Israel—such as Al-Haq, BADIL, DCI-P, and Adalah—which submit reports to the UN Human Rights Council and

the UN. Some of these organizations have been designated as terrorist organizations in Israel due to their connections with the Popular Front.³³

Attempts to block diplomatic relations between Israel and other countries:

The Palestinian Authority operates with Arab, Muslim, and even African and Latin American countries to prevent normalization with Israel or to cancel cooperation agreements. Any political progress with an Arab country (for example, the Abraham Accords) is met with condemnation and Palestinian attempts to thwart it.³⁴

The Palestinians have succeeded in spreading their false narrative worldwide, particularly on university campuses in Europe and even in the United States. Slogans like “From the river to the sea” have become a central tool in Palestinian

to join ICC on April 1,” Al Jazeera, 7.1.2015. [in Hebrew]

31 Ali Sawafta, “Palestinians’ Abbas Swings Behind Boycott Campaign,” “Palestinians Ban Settlement Goods,” Al Jazeera, 26.4.2010; Harriet Sherwood, “Palestinian Boycott of Israeli Settlement Goods Starts to Bite,” The Guardian, 29.1.2010.

32 On the fees and rents collected by Palestinian authorities or security forces from traders in Judea and Samaria: *Unlocking the Trade Potential of the Palestinian Economy*, World Bank Group, shows that to release each shipment, the importer must pay a “service fee” to Palestinian government offices amounting to 5–10 percent of the cargo’s value. *Doing Business 2020: Economy Profile of West Bank & Gaza*, World Bank Group, reports mandatory registration with the Palestinian chambers of commerce at a cost of 50 NIS as a registration fee plus 100 NIS annually as a condition for obtaining an unloading permit. *Ruling Palestine II: The West Bank Model*, Crisisgroup.org, documents local security officers imposing “service” levies on food trucks entering West Bank cities. Dore Gold & Yaacov Amidror (eds.), *Can the Palestinian Authority’s Fatah Forces Retake Gaza? Obstacles and Opportunities*, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Policy Studies 105 (Jan. 2009), pp. 14, 65, note that NSF commander Abu Jaber in Nablus demands “protection money” from business owners as a condition for their security.

33 “Defense Minister Declares Six Popular Front Organizations as Terror Organizations,” Ministry of Justice, 27.10.2021. [in Hebrew]

34 See, for example, Stephan Farrell, “Israel Hails UAE Deal but Palestinians Dismayed,” Reuters, 8.14.2020.

propaganda, presenting their claims as demands for justice and the protection of human rights, and have garnered significant support.

A single sovereign state – Israel – is the only option capable of ensuring Israel’s existence and security for generations to come

The Alternative: Establishing a Long-Term Goal of a Single Sovereign State and Gradually Progressing Toward its Realization

In light of the ongoing threats inherent in the current situation and the severity of the existential danger posed by a sovereign Palestinian state alongside Israel, the long-term objective should be redefined as a single sovereign state – Israel – while granting the Arab population the maximum degree of local self-governance and creating pathways both for voluntary emigration and for Israeli citizenship.

Adopting the goal of a single state indeed represents a strategic shift and requires careful planning to prevent Israel from becoming a bi-national state on the one hand, while ensuring that no long-term, unjustified discrimination arises that part

of the Israeli public cannot accept, and that the international arena will oppose and create diplomatic obstacles. A Jewish state, ultimately, is a more stable and sustainable strategic objective than a Palestinian-Arab state living alongside Israel.

The necessary change for us is mental and psychological. If we were able to undergo such a shift during the signing of the withdrawal agreements, the Oslo Accords, and the Disengagement, we can achieve a similar transformation now. Is this a perfect alternative, free of challenges and costs? Certainly, not. Yet it is the only option capable of ensuring Israel’s existence and security for generations to come, whereas continuing the current situation entails far higher costs and risks.

The practical expression of the strategic shift from two states to a single sovereign state does not have to involve the immediate application of sovereignty over all of Judea and Samaria. Sovereignty should be the final step in a gradual process of changing the reality on the ground. The goal can be clearly defined, and the intention to apply sovereignty can be publicly declared, as recently decided by the Knesset,³⁵ while advancing its implementation gradually and flexibly, according to circumstances and emerging opportunities. Four courses

35 Knesset Plenum, “The Knesset Voted in Favor of a Declaration Calling for the Application of Sovereignty in Judea, Samaria, and the Jordan Valley” (7.23.2025) [declarative decision, not legislation]; see also: Bills on the Application of Sovereignty in Judea and Samaria, P/5720/25; P/5760/25 (25th Knesset) – early discussion status. [in Hebrew]

of action are proposed here to be pursued simultaneously, in line with political possibilities and the international situation.

First Axis: Gradual Application of Sovereignty and Change in Land Management Policy

The Jordan Valley and the Settlement Blocs First

There are areas where the process of applying sovereignty can begin with relative ease: the Jordan Valley, the Greater Ma'ale Adumim area, and then the major settlement blocs.

The Jordan Valley serves as a natural security buffer against the vast Arab-Islamic region east of Israel. Its importance has been underscored recently by Iran's efforts to arm terrorist organizations through smuggling routes in the valley. It is a long and exposed border—especially in light of the fragile situation of the Hashemite regime in the Kingdom of Jordan and its relatively limited ability to act to thwart such activity. Therefore, applying sovereignty in the Jordan Valley would send a sharp and clear message, both to the Palestinians and to the international community, that Israel is determined to ensure its security and will not agree to compromises that could endanger its future. The Arab population in this area is relatively sparse, and therefore does not pose a great demographic challenge. The Jordan Valley is a topographical territorial unit whose entrances and exits can be controlled while requiring the creation

of a physical barrier over relatively small sections. Application of sovereignty in the Jordan Valley includes the territory of the Megillot Regional Council, with a connection southward to the Tamar Regional Council, northward to the Ma'ayanot Valley Regional Council, and to Jerusalem via Highway No. 1. After sovereignty is applied there, infrastructure development should be advanced to connect the area to Highway 5—the Trans-Samaria Highway—in order to attract residents. The valley has unique characteristics of security importance and a sparse population, similar to the Golan Heights, in a way that allows for broad consensus among the Israeli public. The rights and obligations of the Arab-Palestinian population will be elaborated on later.

After applying sovereignty in the Jordan Valley, sovereignty should be applied to the Greater Ma'ale Adumim area, meaning from Qedar and Givat Adumim, through Mitzpe Yehuda toward the Mishor Adumim area and the communities of the Adumim bloc—Mitzpe Jericho, Kfar Adumim, Alon, and Nofei Prat—as well as the E1 area, up to the Az-Za'ayem checkpoint. In this area also live Bedouins from the Jahalin tribe, who would be included at this stage of the application of sovereignty and presented with a pathway to residency and citizenship. This would sever their ties with the Palestinian Authority and allow flexibility regarding the solutions proposed for their relocation or consolidation. This area as well is one whose entrances and exits can be controlled, and parts of it already have

infrastructure in the form of the security fence, which can be completed relatively easily.

The next area would be complete settlement blocs, including the Shilo bloc and the western part of the Gush Etzion bloc, within which the status of the communities, outposts, and farms would also be regulated. Here too, it would be possible to include the Arab villages within the territorial unit and offer a graduated pathway to residency and citizenship.

By contrast, the blanket application of sovereignty over Area C is not recommended, because at present there is no geographic buffer between Area C and the rest of the territory, and therefore it would be impossible to control it as a separate area. This open situation would allow Arabs in the area and its surroundings to seek citizenship through family reunification, similar to the situation in East Jerusalem in Kafr Aqab and the Shuafat refugee camp. Subsequently, it would be possible to advance toward the application of Israeli sovereignty over additional distinct areas, and ultimately over the entire territory.

Reform in the Management of State Lands and Survey Lands

One of the central challenges in applying sovereignty and effective governance in

Judea and Samaria is the management of state lands and lands that are in survey status, whose legal standing has not been normalized. Two-thirds of the lands in Judea and Samaria are not registered in the land registry, whereas one-third of the lands are.³⁶ Among the lands that are not registered, there are several types:

1. Declared state lands.
2. Privately cultivated lands.
3. Survey lands whose legal status has not been determined.

Among the lands that are registered and formalized in the land registry, there are two types:

1. State lands.
2. Private lands.

For lands that are not formalized in the land registry, the law in Judea and Samaria is based on Article 78 of the Ottoman Law, according to which *miri* or *muqafah* land that a person cultivates and holds for ten years without interruption is considered theirs by virtue of possession.³⁷ In other words, it is possible to acquire rights to land through cultivation over time. Therefore, even state lands that are not registered in the land registry and are uncultivated are vulnerable to appropriation, and the authorities must act to protect them. Likewise, survey lands

36 Haim Sandberg, *Public Law of Land in Israel and in the Judea and Samaria Areas*, Jerusalem: Israel Bar Association, 2022. [in Hebrew]

37 "Types of Land in Israel," Yanko & Co. – Law Offices, 8.21.2024. [in Hebrew]

require a legal determination to prevent the kind of illegal takeover described above.

To begin bringing order to the issue and prevent further appropriation, several immediate steps must be implemented:

Registration in the land registry: The process of registering lands in the Tabu must be renewed and applied to all lands in Judea and Samaria, a measure recently announced by the government.³⁸ As part of this, the currently confidential land registry should be opened to the public. This will allow transparency and help protect state lands. Land registration will provide full legal protection, prevent illegal appropriation, and enable a free and functional real estate market.

Mapping and regularization: A land survey must be conducted, and all lands

that are not declared should be registered. Afterward, the registration of declared state lands must be ensured. In addition, the issue of the "blue lines" and the severe consequences resulting from the removal of houses from valid plans must be addressed, and the requirement for opinions in cases of communities established under seizure orders—where they now wish to continue building—should be canceled.³⁹

Enforcement and supervision: Enforcement in the survey land areas must be strengthened to prevent illegal cultivation and appropriation. It is necessary to deploy dedicated monitoring teams and advanced technology for surveillance and enforcement technology, expand the Civil Administration's authority to oversee all lands in Area C, and provide rapid response to illegal takeovers.

38 Nir Hasson, "The Cabinet Ordered to Advance Land Registration," *Haaretz*, 5.12.2025. [in Hebrew]

39 In the 1980s and 1990s, a large portion of the settlements was built based on declarations and determinations of the "blue lines," which define the boundaries of state lands on which construction plans were advanced. Most of these declarations were made by Attorney Pleah Elbak from the State Attorney's Office. In the early 2000s, it was decided to refine these declarations because the plan lines had been roughly drawn without precise digitization. Although in some cases it appeared that plans had been approved even on lands that seemed cultivated, Elbak had conducted very meticulous work and, in some instances, determined that cultivated lands had been abandoned and thus could be used for Israeli construction plans. However, inexperienced and irresponsible junior officials challenged these determinations. As a result of this precision work, many existing houses were removed from approved plans, leaving their owners facing a problem that requires a long and burdensome legal process with the state. The Attorney General did rule that a solution could be applied (using Section 5 of Order 59 regarding government property) but placed the responsibility for implementing it on the affected citizens.

Additionally, settlements established in the 1970s were built under military seizure orders (prior to the period of state land declarations). These settlements did not necessarily utilize the entire area granted under the seizure order, and today, when they wish to make use of it, they must prove that the seizure order was indeed properly formalized. This is a long and arduous process, created by the Attorney General based on a strict interpretation of the law.

Legislation: Administrative orders must be approved to protect state lands and survey lands, and existing orders must be enforced, as they have so far been applied selectively—for example, the “Disturbing Use Order” (an order that allows the military commander to see changes in land cultivation and to instruct its cessation and remove the cultivator from the land), which until now has been applied only against Israelis.

Public diplomacy and international policy: Information should be presented on the international stage to clarify the strategic importance of state lands for Israel, and to highlight the Palestinians’ actions regarding land registration as a unilateral process that undermines regional stability.

Normalization of Land Acquisition in Judea and Samaria

If an Arab wishes to sell land to a Jew today, the process is extremely cumbersome and carries a life-threatening risk for the seller. Approvals must be obtained from Muslim courts operating in the area—which are not under the authority of the State of Israel—for inheritance orders and other matters, and sometimes approval from the PA is also required. Even when the lands are registered, a lengthy process is needed to prove the inheritance orders of the original owners, some of whom reside in hostile countries, which further complicates and delays the transfer of ownership. An Arab who sells land to a Jew may face severe punishment or even a death threat from Palestinian society, where the act is considered a grave

betrayal. Due to the fear of exposure, it is often necessary to use “intermediary Arabs,” which complicates the transaction even further.

If an Arab wishes to sell land to a Jew today, the process is extremely cumbersome and carries a life-threatening risk for the seller

After the land purchase, the real estate transaction must undergo numerous reviews in the Civil Administration, some of which are repetitive, and many approvals are required before the transaction can be registered in the name of the Israeli buyer. These checks and approvals take many years, making it difficult for the buyer to engage in transactions in Judea and Samaria and placing the investment at extremely high risk. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that the Civil Administration system is heavily burdened (partly due to cumbersome requirements), some of the employees handling these cases live in Areas A and B and are subject to pressure and threats, and some have even been prosecuted in the past for accepting bribes to advance or block registration.

To ensure a free, secure, and efficient land market in Judea and Samaria, dramatic steps must be taken to remove existing obstacles. The following are the key actions that could transform the reality on the ground:

Establishment of a Muslim Shari'a Court under Israeli authority: Currently, in any transaction in Judea and Samaria—even between Arabs—approvals from Shari'a courts under the PA are required to verify inheritance orders and ownership rights. An effective solution would be to establish a Muslim Shari'a court operating in Judea and Samaria under Israeli authority, similar to the Shari'a courts functioning in Israel. This court would be recognized by the Israeli authorities and would eliminate landowners' dependence on Shari'a courts under the PA.

Streamlining committee work and appointing additional professional staff: There is an urgent need to reinforce the professional staff within the committees and registration offices. Additional employees should be appointed, preferably Israelis fluent in Arabic, in a manner that matches the scope of the real estate and the volume of transactions, enabling efficient service and shortening the registration time for each transaction.

Land acquisition by the state: The state can serve as a central player in purchasing lands in Judea and Samaria, especially in strategic areas of national interest. It is appropriate for the state to re-enter the field, even through semi-state organizations such as the Jewish National Fund. Acquisition by the state would remove regulatory obstacles and allow for the enactment of orders that facilitate land registration. The state could also bypass the need to

prove long-term ownership ties and carry out a faster process than private entities. Such procedures existed in the past, are legal, and can be reinstated, upgraded, and adapted.

Second axis: Assuming Responsibility for Infrastructure and Upgrading Israeli Administrative Offices

Integrating the Civil Infrastructure of Judea and Samaria into National Plans

Currently, in Israel's infrastructure development at the nationwide level, the Judea and Samaria region is treated as ex-territory. The fact that the State of Israel does not consider these areas as an inherent part of its territory for long-term planning hinders the development of the entire country, resulting in inefficiencies given Israel's geography. This approach must change in light of the shift toward a unified sovereign state. This applies to transportation, electricity, water, and other infrastructure frameworks.

This includes assuming responsibility for all civil infrastructure in the region, including the planning and oversight of roads and interchanges, electricity, water, gas, and renewable energy; preventing air pollution; planning and monitoring sewage treatment facilities; waste collection; and managing key natural resources such as the mountain aquifer, sand and stone quarries, and more.

In the energy sector, it is essential to secure the infrastructure for energy transmission and distribution, including gas pipelines, alongside the promotion and development of renewable energy sources such as solar power, wind turbines, and electricity-generating plants. This infrastructure is a vital component of the region's energy security and quality of life, and it carries long-term environmental and economic implications.

The shift in approach will lead to planning how to connect public transportation infrastructure in Judea and Samaria with the rest of the country, while upgrading existing road systems, Israel Railways infrastructure, and public transport networks, including the light rail systems in Jerusalem and the Gush Dan area. Such development could significantly reduce the existing congestion in central Israel. With the extension of Highway 5 to the Jordan Valley, residents of Gush Dan would be able to travel to the Sea of Galilee via Samaria and the Jordan Valley. Highway 60 could serve as a parallel route to Highway 6, linking Be'er Sheva with Haifa as a 4-lane highway with convenient interchanges and junctions. For electricity, this planning should ensure that the electrical grid and energy distribution networks in Judea and Samaria are fully integrated with the national system, supporting increased capacity for both residential and transport-related energy needs.

In addition, the establishment of an international airport under full Israeli

control should be considered in a strategic location, such as the Allenby Crossing or the Horkania Valley, as has been examined in the past. This airport could serve as an alternative to Ben Gurion Airport and would be preferable even to proposals for airports at Ramat David or Nevatim. It would improve the quality of life for all residents, serve the Palestinian population comfortably, and facilitate those seeking to emigrate. This option could become even more feasible after sovereignty is applied in the Jordan Valley.

Reform of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories and the Civil Administration

Since the Oslo Accords, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and the Civil Administration have been the two main bodies managing the Palestinian population and the area under Israeli control. These bodies reflect the paradigm that Israel's presence is temporary and will eventually transfer authority to the Palestinian Authority and withdraw. With the understanding that Israel will be the sovereign over the entire territory, their roles must be redefined to operate proactively, efficiently, and purposefully, with the aim of preserving Israeli sovereignty and ensuring stability on the ground.

COGAT will henceforth be called "The Office for the Coordination and Upgrading of Government Activities in the Judea and Samaria Region" (possibly abbreviated as *MALSHAB*), or simply "The Regional

Administration Office.” At this stage, and until the application of full sovereignty, the office will continue to operate within the Ministry of Defense, under a designated minister—similar to the existing Settlement Administration currently within the Ministry of Defense.

The new office will focus on leading the overall strategic policy for managing the region and on creating an operational framework that strengthens Israeli interests while providing services to all populations. It will be headed by a civilian at the rank of Director-General of a government ministry, with appropriate experience. The new ministry will be responsible for planning and implementing a comprehensive policy for the overall management of the Judea and Samaria region, coordinating all government offices involved in this matter, including budget consolidation. The ministry will also manage all interfaces with the Palestinians. The policy will include setting a long-term strategy that integrates security, economic, legal, and social solutions, alongside the establishment of municipal authorities throughout the region. Management of all civil matters and the processes of voluntary migration, residency, and citizenship will likely be handled by separate offices in full coordination.

Oversight of the incentives: The ministry will design an incentive system aimed at encouraging cooperation from the Palestinian leadership and population. This system will focus on providing economic,

educational, and social incentives to the population that acts in cooperation, while reducing support for those who do not cooperate. In addition, the ministry will supervise the flow of funds and international aid. Strict monitoring will be conducted to prevent the transfer of funds that finance hostile activities, support terrorism, or contribute to corruption more broadly.

International Cooperation: The ministry will serve as the focal point for foreign relations concerning the region and will lead public diplomacy efforts to strengthen the legitimacy of Israel’s actions on this issue in the international arena. It will engage with international actors to clarify the need for Israeli administration of the territory and to promote international support for Israel’s strategy.

The Civil Administration: Will henceforth be called the “Judea and Samaria District,” similar to the existing districts in Israel that serve as the executive arms of Israeli government ministries. The Judea and Samaria District will function as the primary executive arm in civilian matters, operating through proactive and focused management that ensures full control of the territory as well as effective and efficient service to all residents under its responsibility within the framework of Israeli policy in Judea and Samaria. It will be headed by a civilian with the status of a district director within a government ministry and with appropriate experience. There may be an interim period

during which the office is led by someone responsible for the Israeli sphere, alongside a counterpart heading the Palestinian sphere.

It should be recalled that prior to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, Israel managed the region more effectively in many respects. Even today, Israel administers Area C — in practice most of the territory (3.5 million dunams out of 5.7 million), where Palestinians also reside. The objective is to create municipal mechanisms and a civilian administrative framework similar to that used in Israel in its work with Palestinian local authorities — regional councils throughout the territory. This would include the services currently provided by the Civil Administration vis-à-vis Israeli local authorities — the existing councils in the region.

Land management and enforcement of land laws: The Judea and Samaria district will handle issues related to the land registration system, legal normalization and the status of survey and state lands, the “blue lines,” seizure orders, and more (including opening the existing registry, computerizing systems, establishing appropriate judicial bodies, and simplifying the current mechanism). It will strictly oversee the prevention of illegal takeovers and work to preserve Israel’s strategic areas,

as well as manage the allocation of lands in coordination with the Palestinians according to clear and transparent criteria.

Management and oversight of civil infrastructure and citizen services: The Judea and Samaria district will manage the planning and construction of infrastructure, including roads, water, electricity, gas, wastewater treatment plants, waste disposal sites, emergency services, quarries, transportation, and healthcare services. The district will also establish efficient oversight and collection mechanisms, including payments for electricity, water, and municipal taxes (initially), general licensing, vehicle registration, issuing permits, approvals, fines and enforcement, payments, and budgeting. In addition, it will coordinate directly with government ministries and strengthen the connection to the region, including the rapid and efficient adaptation of legislation in these areas.

Harmonization of legislation, removal of barriers, and creation of solutions to advance infrastructure and construction: It is necessary to regulate contracts concerning the allocation of lands, payment for lands, and the continuation of actions taken so far in these matters, including the adoption of the late Judge Edmond Levy’s report⁴⁰ and the outcomes

40 Levy Committee, *Report on the Examination of the Construction Situation in Judea and Samaria*, Jerusalem: Prime Minister’s Office, 2012; Sandberg Committee, *Regularization of Construction in the West Bank – Final Report*, Jerusalem: Ministry of Justice, 2.15.2018. [in Hebrew]

of the Regularization Committee chaired by Judge Chaya Sandberg,⁴¹ among others. In addition, it is necessary to harmonize legislation and relevant laws in numerous areas where gaps exist, and to reinstate the use of tools that were previously standard—such as “lands under management”—which have since fallen out of use.

Oversight of the education system and mosques: The Judea and Samaria district will supervise Palestinian educational content, with an emphasis on removing incitement from study materials. It will also monitor mosque activities, enforce transparency in religious messages, and prevent their use as platforms for political or hostile incitement.

Coordination of all government ministries with the Judea and Samaria district: The Judea and Samaria district will operate similarly to the existing regional government ministries in Israel. Ministry representatives will primarily report to their parent ministries while maintaining a connection to the regional ministry. With the expansion of sovereignty, the regional ministry will function exactly like a standard Israeli district. Additionally, the regional ministry will need to provide services to the Arab local authorities to ensure uniform policy planning and implementation, while preventing duplication

and improving efficiency in both civil and security administration.

Institutionalizing a dedicated enforcement force: The Judea and Samaria district will operate a dedicated enforcement force, in addition to the Israel Police and similar to the national enforcement unit operating within Israel’s borders, which will work closely with the security forces. This force will provide an immediate response to illegal takeovers of land and infrastructure, integrating high-quality personnel and advanced technology.

Strengthening technological capabilities: The use of artificial intelligence systems and advanced technological tools will enable high-quality and rapid service, as well as assist in identifying and monitoring threats, efficiently managing resources, and providing fast and effective responses.

Mechanism for handling residency and immigration processes: A dedicated mechanism should be established to oversee the residency and citizenship process, operating in coordination with all relevant ministries, including the various security agencies. Additionally, a dedicated office or department should be created to manage voluntary immigration.

41 Sandberg Committee, *Regularization of Construction in the West Bank – Final Report*. [in Hebrew]

Third axis: Dissolution of the Palestinian Authority and Transition to Decentralized Local Governance, Voluntary Migration, or a Naturalization Process

Replacing the Palestinian Authority with a Moderate Local Leadership

The transition from the centralized and corrupt rule of the Palestinian Authority to decentralized, local governance is a necessary condition for addressing all the failures outlined above. This means correcting one of the central mistakes of the Oslo model: the establishment of a centralized authority whose primary energy was devoted to harming the State of Israel in all areas, in addition to the mismanagement of municipal affairs. A local leadership would be required to recognize Israel as the sole sovereign in the territory and would be authorized only to manage civil-municipal affairs. It would operate as a municipal authority (eventually also elected) under the Judea and Samaria district, as detailed above, to ensure compliance with agreements and prevent incitement and support for terrorism. It would not be permitted to act in any way as a national or

sovereign body.⁴² This follows the principle consistently communicated across all systems: recognition of Israel leads to rights and responsibilities, enabling freedom of movement, employment in Israel, and more; whereas incitement and terrorism lead to the exact opposite.

This local leadership could emerge from the large clans that characterize Arab society. The local clan already plays a background role and, in practice, manages a significant portion of daily life. From now on, it would assume additional responsibilities, primarily municipal, which could also include rights such as managing lands within its area and collecting various taxes, all under the Judea and Samaria district as noted. Recently, the initiative of the Hebron sheikhs resurfaced, proposing the implementation of a decentralized local government bypassing the Palestinian Authority.⁴³ Another model to consider is regional councils, similar to the Israeli regional council system, where an elected leadership focuses solely on municipal affairs. It is also possible to consider a canton-style model, granting broader powers to local authorities, similar to arrangements in certain European countries.⁴⁴

42 Raphael BenLevi, "Time to Abandon the Two State Paradigm and Move to Localized Self-Rule under Israeli Sovereignty," *Misgav Institute*, Sept. 2025.

43 Elliot Kaufman, "A New Palestinian Offer for Peace With Israel," *Wall Street Journal*, 7.5.2025 – This article reports on an initiative by five sheikhs in Hebron (led by Sheikh Wadi al-Jaabari) operating outside the Palestinian Authority, including a proposal to establish the "Emirate of Hebron" that would recognize the State of Israel and promote ties under the Abraham Accords.

44 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation (18 April 1999), art. 3, *Constitute Project*; Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1994), arts. 2–5, Venice Commission/Advokat Prnjavorac; EU

It is appropriate to examine any framework or formula that recognizes full Israeli sovereignty while providing locally supervised and budgeted municipal services, similar to the mechanisms currently in place throughout Israel. It is advisable to first implement the model in the easier areas, for example in the Ma'ale Adumim enclave, for the entire Bedouin community of the Jahalin tribe residing there, effectively severing their connection to the Palestinian Authority. A similar model could also be considered for the villages of Hizma-Giv'a, Muhmas, Deir Dibwan, the Hebron area, the Gush Etzion area, and others.

No sovereign state would permit such “freedom of opinion and religion” when its sole purpose is to deny the state’s right to exist

The Palestinian Education System in light of Israeli Sovereignty

The Palestinian education system currently plays a central role in perpetuating hatred and hostility toward Israel, reinforcing the idea of the right of return, and educating the younger generation to continue the violent struggle. No sovereign state would permit such “freedom of opinion and religion”

when its sole purpose is to deny the state’s right to exist.

As part of the transition to local governance, a fundamental change must be advanced in the educational content of the Arab sector. Education should prepare a new generation that recognizes the reality in which the State of Israel is the sole sovereign in the territory. Inciting content will be removed and replaced with materials modeled on the United Arab Emirates’ curriculum, which promotes religious tolerance within traditional Islam and recognition of the State of Israel’s right to exist as the nation-state of the Jewish people. Any Arab village that adopts these new values would be able to enjoy improved civil conditions and the full accumulation of rights under Israeli sovereignty.

Reforming the Palestinian education system should be a central focus of Israel’s strategy. Under Israeli supervision, a new generation will be cultivated that recognizes Israeli sovereignty, focuses on creating a future of cooperation, and avoids perpetuating hatred and violence. Education will no longer be an obstacle to peace but a tool for building regional stability and prosperity under full Israeli governance.

Committee of the Regions, “Division of Powers: Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (updated 2025), Portal CoR; Costa Rica, *Código Municipal, Ley No. 7794* (1998, consolidated 2024), título I, arts. 3–12, PGR Web; Ecuador, *Código Orgánico de Organización Territorial, Autonomía y Descentralización* (COOTAD, 2008), arts. 2–61, Consejo de Participación Ciudadana; STATEC Luxembourg, “Statistics by Geographical Breakdown,” 16.9.2024, Statistiques Luxembourg; El Salvador, *Código Municipal, Decreto No. 274* (consolidated 2023), art. 2, Asamblea Legislativa; Guatemala, *Código Municipal, Decreto No. 12-2002*, art. 19, ACNUR.

Oversight of Mosques and Prevention of Incitement

Strengthening oversight of mosques and preventing incitement are essential steps for creating regional stability and reducing security threats. Thoughtful and balanced action in this area will not only decrease hostility and violence but also help build bridges of understanding and cooperation between different populations, especially in the context of monotheistic belief and mutual religious respect. Through a combination of enforcement, supervision, and collaboration with moderate actors, mosques can be transformed from centers of incitement into centers of connection and community life as a religious minority in a Western state. Successful examples of this approach exist both among Israel's Arab population and internationally.

Effective Oversight of International Aid

In light of the local governance model, Israel and the international community must work together to ensure that international aid continues to strengthen the region and is used to advance the population both at the civil and infrastructure levels—not to support terrorism or incite violence. The large existing gaps in infrastructure, environmental management, unemployment, and relative poverty require committed efforts to reduce disparities, maintain projects, and ensure long-term integration into the population.

Funding should be allocated to improve infrastructure and support various economic

initiatives, especially to promote an economy integrated with the Israeli system. Strict oversight mechanisms must be established to ensure responsible use of funds and eliminate corruption or misuse. The Israeli economy should be central to regional economic development. Palestinians can prosper through integration into the Israeli market, rather than attempting to create an independent economy disconnected from Israel or investing in wasteful, showy projects like Rawabi. Palestinian economic prosperity depends on clear recognition of the State of Israel and the involvement of new Palestinian local leadership in initiatives linked to and integrated with the Israeli economy. If integration and support are managed correctly and fairly, the formula can succeed, enabling local leadership to thrive and significantly improve the current standard of living for Palestinians. Moreover, this represents an economic revival that must be implemented independently of international aid.

Strict Enforcement Against Terrorism and Its Supporters

Any attempt to harm the state's security must be met with a strong response. Effective deterrence involves the use of a wide range of measures, from economic sanctions and movement restrictions to military actions, such as deportation of terrorists, demolition of terrorists' homes, expropriation of property, and more. Family members of anyone involved in any form of terrorist activity would lose their rights, be denied freedom of movement and the

ability to work and earn a livelihood, and infrastructure that supports terrorism would be dismantled and confiscated immediately. At the next stage, the rights of those involved in terrorism or who support it would be completely revoked, and they would be required to emigrate from Israel within a defined period of time. This policy should be accompanied by a comprehensive public diplomacy effort vis-à-vis the international community, presenting evidence of hostile activity by Palestinians.

Dismantling the Security Infrastructure that Threatens Israel

Israel must address the dismantling of security infrastructures that endanger it and gradually transfer the authorities of the Palestinian Authority to the regional ministry (as an alternative to the Civil Administration) and to local municipal leaderships. Operation “Defensive Shield” in 2002 was a successful example of Israel’s ability to operate on the ground and dismantle terrorist infrastructures that developed under the watch of the Palestinian Authority. The operation demonstrated that direct and effective control of the territory enables the eradication of terrorist elements and the restoration of security to Israeli citizens. The model presented in this operation proves the necessity of achieving full control over areas under Palestinian Authority control as

a preliminary and unavoidable step toward ensuring long-term stability.

With regard to the Palestinian police and their armament, during an interim period the possibility should be examined of absorbing Palestinian operatives and police officers who wish to remain in police service under Israeli sovereignty, within and under the authority of the Israel Police, and granting them official recognition—according to clear admission criteria. Their salaries would be paid by Israel. In the second stage, weapons and ammunition would be collected and placed in storage. Such a move, if managed wisely, could succeed without provoking a hostile response. As the State of Israel expands its sovereignty, it will need to integrate more policing and supervisory forces and not rely on the IDF, whose expertise is primarily military and which is not trained to deal with civilian and criminal matters, whether involving Jews or Arabs.

Voluntary Migration

In light of President Trump’s statement regarding his vision to allow Palestinians from Gaza to relocate to other countries,⁴⁵ a voluntary migration and incentive program should be developed for Palestinians in Judea and Samaria who wish to do so. This program would offer improved economic conditions and the option of receiving

45 Karen DeYoung and Cate Brown, “Gaza Postwar Plan Envisions ‘Voluntary’ Relocation of Entire Population,” *The Washington Post*, 8.30.2025.

gradual or full citizenship in another country, in exchange for relinquishing existing rights in Israel and receiving fair compensation from Israel for their existing property. Unlike Gaza, Judea and Samaria include many Palestinians who own land that can be purchased, as has been happening for years in East Jerusalem—in Silwan/City of David, the Muslim Quarter, the Christian Quarter, and other areas. Jews live alongside Arabs there, and a significant number of Arabs choose to sell their property and emigrate.

This is a sensitive and complex issue that requires the development of creative, humane, and effective solutions, enabling individuals, families, and clans who wish to do so to leave voluntarily. It should be noted that most Palestinians migrated to the area over the course of centuries, and their connection to the specific land is not absolute. For many, the broader geographical space of the Middle East—or even other regions of the world—can be seen as a reasonable alternative, since, from a religious or cultural perspective, this particular parcel of land does not hold unique significance for them. This is especially relevant given that many are refugees, meaning they are not in their permanent place of residence. Many countries around the world are in urgent need of skilled labor, and Palestinians could fill this demand, creating opportunities for both themselves and the host nations.

It is worth remembering that between 1948 and 1950, hundreds of thousands of Jews

from Arab countries—such as Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, Morocco, and others—migrated to Israel due to persecution, violence, and discriminatory laws. They did not claim, and do not intend to claim, a “right of return,” nor are they commemorated indefinitely in refugee camps or displaced persons’ camps. Highlighting this precedent alongside financial claims could encourage Arab states to reach a mutual agreement, whereby Palestinian refugees would be allowed to emigrate voluntarily in exchange for the withdrawal or settlement of reciprocal claims.

To implement the voluntary migration option, a dedicated office will be established to work in coordination with the Ministry of Finance, the Israel Land Authority, and other government ministries. This office will conduct appraisals of existing properties, propose fair compensation, coordinate the move to the receiving country, address all obstacles, oversee the process, and ensure that it is fast and straightforward.

Most Palestinians migrated to the area over the course of centuries, and their connection to the specific land is not absolute

Gradual Path to Residency and Integration

First, all management of civilian life will be transferred to the full authority of the Judea and Samaria District (the Civil Administration). Under it, municipal regional councils will operate to oversee

civilian life, similar to the existing Israeli model in Judea and Samaria and to the Arab municipal councils within Israel. All aspects of residents' daily lives will be managed in this manner.

Palestinians who accept the new reality and demonstrate understanding, loyalty, and refrain from any direct or indirect connection to terrorism will be given the opportunity to integrate into the Israeli labor market, initially as residents and eventually, potentially, as citizens.

This process will include several stages:

Stage One - Trial: After being offered a fair voluntary migration option, a Palestinian who instead wishes to upgrade their status to residency will submit a request, including a declaration recognizing the State of Israel as the sovereign authority. They will enter a probationary period of five to ten years, during which they must refrain from direct or indirect participation in terrorist or criminal activities. During this period, their request will be evaluated. A Palestinian who chooses not to participate will have their rights restricted, including no permits for work, free movement, travel abroad, healthcare services, and more (similar to the current situation).

Stage Two – Residency: A resident will be allowed freedom of movement and integration into the Israeli labor market.

Residency will grant access to basic services, healthcare, welfare, and the ability to travel abroad. All rights come with obligations, including taxes, municipal fees, and national insurance. Continued compliance with security and civil criteria is required.

Stage Three – Citizenship: After the residency stage, there will be the option to apply for full citizenship. Citizenship will be conditioned on passing Hebrew language proficiency tests and committing to national service—civilian, military, or police. In accordance with Section 5 of the Israeli Citizenship Law, renunciation of previous citizenship will be required.

It is worth noting that in East Jerusalem, where the State of Israel has applied its sovereignty, approximately 400,000 Arabs hold permanent residency status. Of these, about 5% applied for and received full citizenship. Most Arabs with permanent residency do not vote in Knesset elections but participate in municipal elections. It is likely that implementation in Judea and Samaria would follow a similar pattern.

The very opening of the possibility for citizenship raises the long-term demographic question. This is a weighty issue, but ultimately, the trend favors the Jewish population. In recent decades, the average number of children per Palestinian woman has dropped from 6 to 3.7,⁴⁶ while among Jewish women it has increased

46 "Fertility Rate, Total for the Occupied Palestinian Territory", *fred.stlouisfed.org*, 4.16.2025

from 2.5 to 3.2.⁴⁷ This trend appears to be strengthening, so looking ahead, one can be cautiously optimistic.

There are currently an estimated 2.2 million Palestinian Arabs in the Judea and Samaria.⁴⁸ If Israel succeeds in encouraging voluntary Arab migration, it can maintain or even reduce the existing Palestinian population while the overall Israeli population grows and fertility rates continue their upward trend. This would allow for a reasonable demographic balance, and if all measures are implemented, Israel could gradually apply its sovereignty over the entire territory without significant long-term concerns, similar to the practical implementation in East Jerusalem.

Fourth axis: Effective Public Diplomacy on the International Stage

For all the actions outlined here, a well-structured public diplomacy program is required to explain the initiative to other countries around the world. It is not necessary to convince everyone, but it is crucial to present our reasoning and explain why, in our view, this is a fair course of action—one that is also the only approach capable of enabling prosperity and security

for all populations in the country. Israel should operate under the assumption that various elements in the international community will find it difficult to accept this and may even express opposition for various reasons. Nevertheless, Israel must remain steadfast in communicating that the proposed plan is the best option, even for the Palestinian Arabs. This is also the truth that will ultimately prevail.

Israel as the bastion of the free world: In relation to countries that are also threatened by Islamism (the U.S., Europe, India, and many others), it should be emphasized that Jewish sovereignty serves as an anchor for stability and the prevention of terrorist chaos in the region, and that this is the only way to prevent the recurrence of events like October 7.

Effective Israeli public diplomacy should clarify that its struggle against Islamic terrorism is no different from the battles that Western countries are expected to face within their own borders. Nations that ignore the threat of radical Islam may find themselves confronting it on their own soil. Israel, positioned at the forefront of this fight, is not only defending itself but the entire free world.

47 Alex Weinreb, Dov Chernichovsky & Aviv Brill, "Israel's Unusual Fertility Patterns", *taubcenter.org.il*, 12.2018 [in Hebrew]

48 Bennett Zimmerman, Roberta Seid, and Michael L. Wise, "The Million Person Gap: The Arab Population in the West Bank and Gaza," *Mideast Security and Policy Studies* No. 65 (Ramat Gan: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, February 2006). Available at: <https://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/02/MSPS65.pdf>

The Abraham Accords, achieved despite the absence of a comprehensive resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, serve as an example that Israel can foster fruitful diplomatic relations with moderate Arab states without compromising its security and national principles. They highlight that the international community, including Sunni Arab countries, is capable of seeing Israel as a partner for regional stability. These accords gained even greater significance when, following the October 7th attack and Israel's response, no country withdrew from the agreements; on the contrary, many expressed disapproval of the brutal attack against Israel.

Jewish sovereignty serves as an anchor for stability and the prevention of terrorist chaos in the region, and that this is the only way to prevent the recurrence of events like October 7

Israel's successes in the Iron Swords War against the Iranian proxy network and against Iran itself have changed the regional and international playing field. They revealed the dependence of regional states on Israel's stability and security strength, making Israel the central anchor protecting against shared regional threats. Furthermore, although Saudi Arabia frames a Palestinian state as a condition for normalization, with careful diplomacy, it may accept the solutions proposed in this document as pathways to prosperity under Israeli central governance.

Alternatively, its involvement in resolving the situation in Gaza could suffice to demonstrate its concern for the Palestinians. If the United States insists on upgrading relations with Saudi Arabia, Israel may prefer to accommodate that through alternative Arab governance in Gaza, but not in Judea and Samaria, where sovereignty will be implemented.

Emphasizing the historical and legal right: It must be clearly stated: the Jewish people are the indigenous people of this region, whose culture, tradition, language, and religion are directly rooted in this land. Judea and Samaria form the heart of the Jewish national story, and we hold both a legal and moral right to this territory.

Summary: A Realistic and Sober Alternative

The approach proposed here combines firm enforcement with pragmatic solutions that address both security needs and civilian challenges, while strengthening Israeli sovereignty and ensuring long-term stability.

The framework for managing the Palestinian population must shift from a reactive system to a clear and comprehensive strategy. Israel, as the sovereign in the area, needs to initiate a systematic change that links security, settlement, economy, infrastructure, and education. A gradual process of encouraging migration, applying sovereignty, and granting residency and citizenship is a central part of this, alongside setting clear

red lines while creating a positive horizon for those willing to live peacefully and loyally under Israeli sovereignty.

The proposed policy emphasizes that reality does not stand still, and numerous threats exist to the State of Israel due to the continued management of the conflict without a clear long-term goal. The current political and security reality is incapable of producing a new generation of Arabs who desire peace with us.

The history of the Oslo Accords, culminating in the events of October 7th, serves as unequivocal proof of the need for a fundamental change in Israeli policy in Judea and Samaria. This policy must be based on a clear principle: the State of Israel is the sole sovereign in the region, and the Palestinians can integrate into the model proposed here as a thriving, contributing, and prosperous minority that recognizes the legitimacy of the State of Israel.